worked on the chall
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res/mosaic_secret_message
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From: hochspezialisiert@sec.in.tum.de
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To: itsec_examdraft@sec.in.tum.de
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Subject: [Draft Question — Cryptography]
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Confidential (ONLY FOR AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL)
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Question:
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Consider a toy "QR-encryption" scheme where a message is encoded into
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a QR code and then randomized by permuting its tiles with a secret seed.
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(a) Under ideal assumptions, explain why this scheme could satisfy
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Kerckhoffs’ principle.
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(b) Now assume an attacker can test permutations against the QR format
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(find patterns, error correction, alignment markers). Why does this
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reduce the effective security of the scheme?
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Solution (DO NOT DISTRIBUTE):
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(a) If the algorithm is known and the seed remains secret, only the
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seed determines security → aligns with Kerckhoffs’ principle.
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(b) QR codes have strong structural redundancy (finder patterns,
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error correction). This gives the attacker an oracle to prune wrong
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seeds quickly → brute force feasible.
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Verification Token:
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